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The Warsaw Convention's Liability Limitations Extend to Air
Carrier Employees As Well As The Corporate Carrier In An Ac-
tion Brought For Damages Resulting From An International Air
Crash. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 399 (1977).
On September 8, 1974, a Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight
enroute from Tel Aviv to New York crashed into the Ionian Sea
killing all seventy-nine passengers and nine crew members aboard.
The crash allegedly was caused by an explosion of a bomb placed
on board the airplane in Athens. Subsequently, personal represen-
tatives of nine of the deceased brought suit against the president
and staff vice-president of audit and security of TWA in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants were responsible for security on TWA
flights and were negligent in failing to institute or maintain a satis-
factory security system to prevent placement of the bomb.'
The defendants denied liability and pled as an affirmative de-
fense the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention? as modified by
the Montreal Agreement of 1966,' which would have placed maxi-
mum recovery at $75,000.00 for each decedent. In most cases, the
corporate carrier is made the defendant; here, however, by bringing
an action against the employees of the carrier, apparently the plain-
tiffs hoped to avoid the Convention limitations.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all
1555 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1977).
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000 et seq., T.S. No. 876 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as the Convention and referred to by article number]. The Convention was
concluded at Warsaw, Poland, in October, 1929.
131 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). Both the Convention and the Montreal Agree-
ment are found at 49 U.S.C. S 1502 (1970).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970) provides that "[wihen civil actions involving one
or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions
may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial pro-
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federal court cases regarding the crash to Judge Frankel of the
Southern District of New York' where plaintiffs moved to strike
the defense of limited liability. The court granted that motion' cer-
tifying" to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit the question of the availability to the defendants of the Con-
vention limitations;" that court granted leave to appeal.
Held: Reversed and remanded with instructions: The Warsaw
Convention's liability limitations extend to air carrier employees
as well as the corporate carrier in an action brought for damages
ceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict liti-
gation . .. ."
5In Re Air Crash in the Ionian Sea, 407 F. Supp. 238 (1974).
6 Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863 (1976).
728 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
' In granting the motion to strike, Judge Frankel noted "[The question] is by
no means susceptible of a clear and entirely confident answer," 414 F. Supp. at
864; and that in looking to the treaty for textual support, he found no "indication
... of deliberate attention to the question now confronted." 414 F. Supp. at 865.
Finding the Convention language silent and little aid available from legislative
and case history, the court then turned to policy considerations in reaching a
conclusion.
In support of servant limitation, the court cited the "well understood" aim to
protect the then-infant air travel industry from perhaps fatal burdens of un-
limited compensation; however, it saw that original purpose no longer very per-
suasive:
It would be consistent with that policy to protect the young in-
dustry to extend the protection to employees and agents, who might
otherwise press for insurance or other forms of indemnity .... It is
not insignificant to note, however, that the original policy has lost
a great deal of its persuasive force: air travel is no longer an infant
industry.
414 F. Supp. at 865 (footnote omitted).
Policy arguments against extending the liability limitations were: (1) the
court's recognition that a "powerful" national policy which favored compensatory
damages from tortfeasors who cause personal injury, and a corollary "of equal
importance," that American law was adverse to stipulations by common carriers,
without congressional authority, against their negligence or that of their agents
or servants. 414 F. Supp. at 865-66; (2) the absence of any express provision
conferring on agents or servants the Convention limitations. Id. at 866. ("With-
out resting too heavily upon canons, we know this is not a case for loose interpre-
tations. The limitation for agents and employees would have been easy enough
to specify." 414 F. Supp. at 867); (3) domestic criticism about the Convention's
liability limitations. 414 F. Supp. at 866. See, e.g., remarks of Sen. Yarborough,
111 CONG. REC. 15,032 (1965); remarks of Sen. R. Kennedy, 111 CONG. REC.
at 20,164; and Wright, The Warsaw Convention's Damages Limitations, 6 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 290, 293 (1957) (Convention limitations are "un-American");
(4) the Supreme Court's refusal to extend similar limitations of the Goods by
Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970), to stevedores or other agents. 414 F. Supp.
at 866; and (5) failure of the United States to ratify The Hague Protocol and
its Article 25A. 414 F. Supp. at 867-68.
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resulting from an international air crash. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, .._ U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 399
(1977).
The Warsaw Convention, as a result of two international con-
ferences held in Paris (1925) and Warsaw (1929), and the work
of the interim Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridique
A6riens (CITEJA),' contains a treaty embodying two main pur-
poses: to provide uniform rules relating to air transportation docu-
ments, and to limit air carrier liability for accidents associated with
air travel." Liability originally was limited to 125,000 francs
($8,300.00) per passenger," but a carrier would not be liable at
all if it were proven that the carrier and his agents exercised "all
necessary measures" to avoid the damage or it was impossible for
him or his agents to take such measures.' In effect, the treaty estab-
lished a presumption of carrier liability, thus shifting the usual bur-
den of proof."3 The Convention, however, contained no definition
of "carrier";"' that is, the Convention failed to explicitly define car-
rier as to include agents or employees within the terms of the treaty.
The United States was neither a representative to nor a signatory
of the treaty, but in 1934, the Senate of the United States an-
nounced adherence," thereby placing the country under the treaty
terms as "the law of the land."" Discussion of the treaty began al-
most immediately and international conferences were held in Cairo
(1946), Madrid (1951), Paris (1952), and Rio de Janeiro
(1953). The 1955 Hague Conference produced amendments" to
the Convention including a higher recovery limitation of almost
9 Lowenfeld & Mendolsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 498 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn],
1 Kennelly, The Warsaw Convention Treaty, 13 TRIAL LAWYERS GUIDE 213,
217 (1969).
" Convention, supra note 2, Article 22.
1" Convention, supra note 2, Article 20.
" Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir.
1967).
"1414 F. Supp. at 865. "[T]he treaty language includes separate, distinguishing
references to carriers and their agents. There is no indication, however, of de-
liberate attention to the question now confronted." Id.
1"78 CONG. REC. 11,582 (1934). Adherence was agreed "without debate,
committee hearing, or report. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at
502.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
"The Hague Protocol, signed September 28, 1955.
1978]
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$16,600.00 and Article 25A expressly extending that limitation to
air carrier agents and employees;18 Article 25A provides that in
an action brought for damages against an employee or agent of the
carrier arising from employment related duties, Convention limita-
tions of liability apply. Due to dissatisfaction with the "inadequate"
increase, the United States delegation did not sign The Hague Pro-
tocol at the conference, but later at the delegation's request the
United States' ambassador to Poland did sign in 1956."' Because of
events accelerating domestic dissatisfaction with the limitations,
however, the Senate never ratified the Protocol; ' * thus, the United
States is governed by the Convention, unamended by The Protocol.
In November, 1965, the State Department filed formal notice of
denunciation of the treaty, effective in May, 1966. According to
a State Department news release, however, the denunciation would
be withdrawn if principal international air carriers would raise lia-
bility limitations to $75,000.00, and if there was like prospect that
the Convention could be modified accordingly." As a result, in May,
1966, the United States signed, with the major international air-
lines, the Montreal Agreement, " under which each signing carrier
was bound to include in its tariff a special contract raising the li-
ability limit to $75,000.00 and waiving the Convention's "due care"
defense. In accepting the Agreement, the State Department with-
'
2 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 502-7. Convention Article 25A
provides:
1. If an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier
arising out of damage to which this Convention relates, such servant
or agent, if he proves that he acted within the scope of his employ-
ment shall be entitled to avail himself of the limits of liability
which that carrier himself is entitled to invoke under Article 22.
2. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier,
his servants and agents, in that case shall not exceed the said limits.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall not
apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omis-
sion of the servant or agent done with intent to cause damage or
recklessness and with knowledge that damage would probably result.
19Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 511-12. Failure of the United
States to sign The Hague Protocol was not due to dissatisfaction with the Con-
vention, but with the low liability limitations. See H. DRION, THE LIMITATIONS OF
LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW (1954) [hereinafter cited as H. DRION].
20 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 512-16.
21 Press Release No. 268, 53 DEPT. STATE BULL. 923, 924 (1965).
22The Montreal Agreement was approved by the United States through the
Civil Aeronautical Board. 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). The agreement applies to
those subscribers whose flights land or take off in the United States.
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drew its denunciation."
At the urging of the United States and in response to the Mon-
treal Agreement, the Guatemala Protocol!' was drafted in 1971.
That Protocol, which would amend the Convention, raised the li-
ability limitation to $100,000.00.' The Senate has yet to act on
that document."
While Convention history is well documented, case history de-
fining whether agents or employees of the carrier are covered by
the Convention unamended by Article 25A, is as sparse as it is non-
definitive. The case history generally follows two courses, as repre-
sented by the brief opinions in Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc."' and
Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines.' In Pierre, the plaintiff sued
to recover damages for injuries sustained from an aircraft crash. In
addition to naming the corporate carrier as a defendant, the plain-
tiff also brought suit against the pilot. The district court rejected the
pilot-defendant's Convention limitation defense; the court found
support in the fact that the subsequently enacted Hague Protocol
expressly provided extension of the liability limitations.' The court
reasoned that because the terms of the Convention in effect at the
time of the crash were unamended by Article 25A, the Convention
254 DEPT. STATE BULL. 955 (1966). A concurrent news release stated, "[Tlhe
conditions which led the United States to serve its notice of November 15 have
substantially changed. Accordingly, the United States of America believes that its
continuing objectives of ... adequate protection for international air travelers
will best be assured within the framework of the Warsaw Convention." Press Re-
lease No. 111, 54 DEPT. STATE BULL. 956 (1966).
2'The Guatemala City Protocol, signed March 8, 1971.
Landry, Yes or No on the Guatemala Protocol-Pro, 10 FORUM 727, 735
(1975). Based on the current price of gold, that limit is now more than
$400,000.00. The protocol also established a standard of absolute liability for the
carrier. Id.
IOn January 14, 1977, as one of the last acts of the outgoing President
Gerald R. Ford, the President transmitted, for the Senate's advice and consent,
the amending Protocol's "done at Montreal on September 25, 1975 entitled ...
Additional Protocol No. 3 [The Hague and Guatemala City Protocols] and the
"Montreal Protocol No. 4. 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 43-44 (Jan.
14, 1977).
27 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
28 132 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
29 152 F. Supp. at 489. "The Warsaw Convention at the time of the accident
(1953) applied to the carrier only .... Therefore, the general practice and rules
prevalent in the trial of negligence cases unaffected by the terms of the Warsaw
Convention, will control the trial of the plaintiff against the defendant Foxworth
[pilot]." Id.
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limitations applied only to the corporate carrier.' Thus, the court
was of the opinion that if The Hague Protocol's Article 25A was
needed to cover the carrier agents or servants, then they must not
have been originally covered without such article.
In Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, a case involving non-
employee agents of the carrier, the plaintiff was injured when she
stepped from the plane as the boarding steps were being removed
by the corporate carrier's agent who provided such equipment and
services. The court found the damage limitiations of the Con-
vention" applicable as "it is impractical to distinguish the carrier
from the community of persons whose joint activity is the carrier's
activity." 2 The Chutter court found an analogy to the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Acte, persuasive.' The strength of that analogy
was based on two casess' in which the courts reasoned that because
the agents were performing part of the contract of carriage, those
agents were covered by the liability limitations of that Act." Chut-
ter also cited Wanderer v. Sabena," in which the New York Su-
preme Court without any elaboration or explanation, held the Con-
vention to cover agents employed to perform part of the carriage
contract."
While case history supplies little legal fodder, the United States
Supreme Court's opinions about treaty interpretation are more
plentiful. Case law indicates that where the treaty abrogates some
common law right or lacks any ambiguity, it is impermissible for
a court to look beyond the document's four comers. The Court has
stated, as a canon of construction, treaties in derogation of com-
mon law rights must be strictly construed." In The Amiable Isa-
so Id.
3 Convention, supra note 2, Article 25A.
32 132 F. Supp. at 613.
'346 U.S.C. S 1300 et seq. (1970).
3 132 F. Supp. at 613.
"I United States v. The South Star, 210 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1954); A.M. Collins
and Co. v. Panama R.R., 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952).
1 132 F. Supp. at 613.
11 1949 U.S. Av. Rep. 25 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1949).
3I Id. at 26.
39See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821), and Rocca
v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317 (1912).
In Amiable Isabella, Justice Storey stated:
In the first place, this Court does not possess any treaty-making
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bella,' the Court found "no room for interpretation, on account
of the ambiguous language of the parties," because they have "ex-
pressed themselves in the clearest manner."'" In Rocca v. Thomp-
son,' the Court observed that treaty interpretation must take into
account the "conditions and circumstances at the time of drafting
and should be read in consideration of the purposes of those sign-
ing. ' Absent the above mentioned situations, however, the Court
has noted that treaties should be more "liberally construed" than
private agreements, and to ascertain the meaning of a treaty, a court
should "look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty,
the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
parties."
The Second Circuit in Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc.,' which
passed on the question of whether the contract for transportation
power. That power belongs by the constitution to another depart-
ment of the government; and to alter, amend or add to any treaty,
by inserting any clause, whether small or great, important or tri-
vial, would be on our part an usurption of power and not an exer-
cise of judicial functions. It would be to make, and not to construe
a treaty. Neither can this Court supply a casus omissus in a treaty,
any more than in a law. We are to find out the intention of the
parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject matter;
and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes,
and to stop where that stops-whatever may be the imperfections or
difficulties which it leaves behind.
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 71.
In Rocca, the Court said framers of treaties carefully draft documents, and
the framers are competent "to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes
of the high contracting parties." 223 U.S. at 332.
Note that in Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297
(1959), relied on by the district court in Reed, the Supreme Court had found,
in refusing to extend a law's limitations of liability of an agent, that the act de-
fined "carrier" in a "clearly phrased" statute. Id. at 301.
4 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821).
41 19 U.S. at 69-70.
- 223 U.S. 317 (1912).
43 223 U.S. at 331-32. There the Court observed: "Like other contracts,
[treaties] are to be read in the light of the conditions and circumstances existing
at the time they were entered into with a view to effecting the objects and pur-
poses of the States thereby contracting. In re Ross, Petitioner, 140 U.S. 453, 475."
Id.
44Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
See, e.g., Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1977), and Block v. Campagnie Nationale Air France,
386 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) (question
raised as to whether "carrier" under the Convention includes charterer).
- 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
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was made under the Convention's Article 28, laid down general
guidelines for convention interpretation which provided a more
"liberal" interpretational approach. " In Block v. Compagnie Na-
tionale Air France' the court addressed the question of which entity
other than the contracting carrier, i.e., the owner or charterer of
the aircraft, could be held liable in case of accident. The Block
court noted that the "necessity for maintaining uniformity, even
when the Convention is applied in a country, such as the United
States, having a doctrinal basis for its legal system different from
civilian systems, compels a broad construction of the Convention.""8
In Reed v. Wiser, the Second Circuit was presented with the
question of whether the Convention's liability limitations extend to
the corporate carrier employees. In so deciding, the court looked
to previous cases as well as treaty interpretation guidelines. In find-
ing that those limitations extend to the employees, Judge Mansfield
for a unanimous court noted the question to be of "great impor-
tance" and an issue "raised for the first time at the federal appellate
level."' The American cases, he observed, have splite° between
1 Id. at 812. The court there stated:
A court faced with this problem of interpretation, or another
problem like it, can well begin with an inquiry into the purpose of
the provision that requires interpretation. . . .The inquiry may lead
the court to conclude that the provision's language accurately re-
flects its purpose; in such a situation the court is most faithful to
the purpose if the language is interpreted literally. Conversely, the
inquiry may lead the court to conclude that the language of the pro-
vision only imperfectly manifests its purpose, or that when the
words were first chosen the language accurately reflected the pro-
vision's purpose but that today the same words imperfectly reflect
this purpose because conditions have changed in the area to which
the words of the provision refer. It would be inconsistent with the
"wise counsel to reject 'the tyranny of literalness'," if the court in
the latter situations did not seek to interpret the provisions as to
effectuate its purpose, even if this requires departing in some mea-
sure from the letter and reading the language in a practical rather
than literal fashion. (citations omitted) Id.
47 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
41 Id. at 337-38. The court there likened a treaty to "a uniform law" within
the United States, and thus a court has an obligation to keep interpretation as
uniform as possible. Id.
In Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 158 (3d Cir.
1977), the court, in interpreting the Convention's Article 17 phrase, "in the course
of embarking," utilized a "common sense" construction, and also concluded that,
absent explicit language to the contrary, a CITEJA draft rejection did not mani-
fest intention to exclude from interpretation a more inclusive meaning.
49555 F.2d 1079, 1081-1082 (2d Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1081-82.
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Chutter and Wanderer on one hand and Pierre on the other.
The appellees argued that a distinction could be drawn between
Chutter, upholding Convention limitations for carrier agents, and
the present case involving carrier employees. The appellees further
argued that even if the applicability of Chutter is assumed, the
Chutter court's holding was based on two decisions"1 which the Su-
preme Court subsequently rejected." The appellants argued while
Chutter is not factually on point, the analogy drawn there, extend-
ing coverage of the Act to agents, is valid in the case of carrier em-
ployees. Without discussion of these arguments, the court turned
to interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the Convention as
the basis for its decision. The court, however, stated that "to the
extent the decided cases indicate anything, they would support, on
balance, the conclusion that employees should be covered,"" and
that with the possible exception of the Pierre decision, there has
never been a Warsaw Convention case in which a plaintiff has ob-
tained, by suing the carrier's employees instead of the carrier itself,
more than that amount for which the carrier would be liable under
the Convention."
With respect to interpretation of the treaty, the court noted the
following provisions as pertinent to the decision:
Article 17: The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained
in the event of the death or wounding or any other bodily in-
jury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft....
Article 22: In the transportation of passengers the liability
of the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum
of 125,000 francs ...
Article 24: (1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19
any action for damages, however founded, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
convention. (2) In the cases, covered by article 17 the provi-
11 United States v. The South Star, 210 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1954); A.M. Collins
& Co. v. Panama R.R., 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952).
5Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297 (1959).
In Chutter, the court found the relevant act covered the agent, an independent
stevedoring company engaged by the carrier to load cargo.
"3555 F.2d at 1087, n. 11.
"Id. at 1088, n.11.
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sions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply....
The court said that the first question was whether, in the absence
of an express definition of "transporteur" (carrier),," that term is
limited to the corporate carrier, or whether it is intended to "em-
brace the group or community of persons actually performing the
corporate entity's functions."'" In other words, was the absence of
such definition meant to restrict the Convention limitations only to
TWA, or was the intent to include carrier employees as well? The
second issue involved interpretation of the French text: specifically,
whether the official English translation employed the proper defini-
tion of the French word "cas."
With respect to the first question, the appellees argued that be-
cause the Convention derogates a common law right, it should be
strictly construed and not applied beyond the scope justified by its
language and history"' and, that the inclusion of Article 25A in
The Hague Protocol showed that the unamended Convention did
not extend to employees." Thus, to expand the definition of carrier
to include the employees would not be a justified reading of the
treaty. The appellants, however, urged a liberal construction of the
treaty so as to effectuate its purpose and to give it the proper mean-
ing consistent with the expectations of the contracting parties to
the Convention." The appellants also asserted that the national pol-
icy expressed in a treaty permitting the limitation of liability is su-
perior to any inconsistent common law rule."
In answering the first issue, the court recognized, as did the dis-
trict court,' that "the liability of the wrongdoing agent" is a sepa-
rate and clear source of redress, distinct from and logically prior
to that of the principal."' The court said that the Convention, taken
Id. at 1088.
"Id. at 1082. The official text, as mandated in Article 36 was drawn in
French. Id. at n.6.
17555 F.2d at 1083.
"2 Brief for Appellees at 6-8, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
"Id. at 20-24.
"Brief for Appellants at 9, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
"I d. at 28.
62 414 F. Supp. at 866.
""Agent," as used here, is the employee agent, as distinguishable from the
nonemployee agent of the carrier.
64 555 F.2d at 1083.
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as an international uniform law,' must be read in context of na-
tional legal systems of Convention members; and, in at least some
jurisdictions, the language of Article 22(1), limiting carrier liabil-
ity to 125,000 francs per passenger, would limit employee liability
under the Convention.6 Thus, a purely common law interpretation
of the article is thought inappropriate. In effect, the court, in the
context of a world-wide treaty, recognized its duty to provide an in-
terpretation as harmonious as possible with other legal systems. For
each signatory country's courts to restrict its treaty interpretations,
its system's legal principles alone would necessarily dilute if not
destroy the purpose of such a treaty. Moreover, the court stated
that the authors of the Convention intended Article 24 to prevent
circumvention of the limitations of Article 22, as any other reading
"would defeat the purpose of Article 24. .. "'
The court noted that as to the second interpretational question,
the district court, under the unofficial English translation, used
"cas" in Article 17 to read "event," but where used again in Article
24(1) and (2), translated as "cases. '" ' The use of "cases" instead
of "events," according to the court, would be a more limiting read-
ing of the Convention, prescribing application of the liability limi-
tations to agents or employees. The court stated that a more accu-
rate, less ambiguous translation would use, instead of "cas" (in a
nonjuridical sense), "event" uniformly throughout because ordi-
narily "cas" is not used to refer to a lawsuit." The court's interpre-
tation of Article 24 would read: "(1) In the events anticipated in
Articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however founded, can
only be brought subject to conditions and limits set out in this con-
vention. (2) In the events covered by Article 17, the provisions of
the preceding paragraph shall also apply...." 6
386 F.2d at 337-38.
66 See, e.g., remarks of the Italian delegate, 1 International Conference on
Private Air Law, The Hague, September, 1955, Minutes 220, ICAO Doe. 7686-
LC/140 (1956); and later, 1 International Conference on Private Air Law, Guada-
lajara, August-September, 1961, Minutes 134, ICAO Doc. 8301-LC/149-1 (1962).
See also remarks of the Norwegian delegate, 1 International Conference on
Private Air Law, The Hague, September, 1955, Minutes 361, ICAO Doc. 7686-
LC/140 (1956).
67 555 F.2d at 1084-85. See, H. DRION, supra note 19, § 136, at 158.
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Thus, an expanded reading of Article 24 would imply that the
limits contained therein would apply to the present case because the
suit is an "action for damages, however founded," due to damages
sustained "in the event of the death... of a passenger... on board
the aircraft. .. ." The court found support for this reading in post-
Convention comments."
The court also noted the lack of documented discussion con-
cening employee liability limitations at the Paris and Warsaw con-
ferences, and stated that "[a]lthough the legislative history of the
Convention does not affirmatively or expressly support the fore-
going interpretation, it contains nothing indicating a contrary in-
tention."" While post-Convention commentators were split on the
issue,"2 the Association of Airline Pilots pressed for resolution of
the issue, and The Hague Conference adopted Article 25A "if only
to resolve the controversy."74
The court found the trial court's reliance on the United States'
failure to ratify The Hague amendments as "misplaced," observing
that the history of attempted ratification of The Hague Protocol
makes clear that the only reason for refusal to ratify was dissatis-
faction with the low level of the carriers' liability limitations, and
not the other provisions of the Protocol.'5 The court also noted the
otherwise supportive comment of Federal Aviation Administrator
Halaby to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," as well as the
fact that the notice of Warsaw denunciation was withdrawn after
the Montreal Agreement was signed."
The court followed Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc.," where
it looked to the Convention purpose in aid of interpretation." As
71 Id. See, e.g., H. DRION, supra note 19.
T1 555 F.2d at 1085.
7 Id.
" The court notes the necessity for the article was doubted by some of The
Hague delegates. See the comments by delegates. 555 F.2d at 1085-86, and n.8 at
1085.
" Id. at 1087.
71 Id. at 1086. Halaby commented that the FAA approved of "just about every-
thing" in The Hague but the "central defect": the low limit of liability. Hague
Protocol to Warsaw Convention: Hearings Be/ore the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 19 (1965).
7' 555 F.2d at 1087.
78 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
79 555 F.2d at 1088. See Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 36-37
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stated by Secretary of State Hull in transmitting the Convention to
the Senate in 1934, the Convention would provide for a "more def-
inite basis on which to obtain insurance rates...."* As the court
viewed the Convention, that purpose has not since changed, as evi-
denced by subsequent history.81 To subject the carriers to unlimited
recoveries through their employees would defeat that purpose. In
response, appellees asserted that contentions concerning indemnifi-
cation overlooked the plain meaning of the Convention."
The court likewise took notice of indemnification as a modern-
day reality, and of the fact that airlines would not long be able to
operate without indemnifying employees for liabilities incurred as
a carrier agent.8" Thus, absent proof to the contrary, the court
sought to carry out the framers' intent, vis a vis application of the
liability limitations to carrier employees."
Recognizing yet another purpose for imposing the liability limi-
tations, the court stated that the district court decision would allow
plaintiffs to subject parties and courts to a "jungle-like chaos" if
the Convention's uniform system of liability rules governing "fund-
amental aspects" of international air disaster litigation were cir-
cumvented.' A decision more contrary to the "acknowledged pur-
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 89 (1978) and Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane, 370 F.2d 508, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by divided court, 390 U.S.
455 (1968).
£8SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CER-
TAIN RULES, S. ExEc. Doc. No. G., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
81 555 F.2d at 1089. The court sees the Montreal Agreement and the Guate-
mala Protocol as indicative of the fact that the limitations per se have not been
in question, but, rather, the extent of those limits: "Nevertheless, at no time has
this country ever abandoned the basic principal that, whatever the limits may be,
air carriers should be protected from having to pay out more than a fixed and
definite sum for passenger injuries sustained in international air disasters." (foot-
note omitted.) Id.
82 Brief for Appellees at 34, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
83 555 F.2d at 1090.
8id.
1 Id. at 1092-93. If agents or employees are not covered by the liability limi-
tation of the Convention, they are likewise not subject to the litigation rules of
the Convention. Those rules are: Article 28 (venue); Article 20 (burden of
proof); Articles 20 and 25 (standards of negligence); Articles 18(3) and 26 (pre-
sumptions); Article 23 (contractual liability limitations); Article 27 (suits against
estate of tortfeasor); Article 29 (statute of limitations); Article 30 (liability in
event of carriage by more than one carrier; and Articles 22 and 25 (damage
awards).
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poses" of the Convention would be "difficult to imagine. ' ,
As for other contentions advanced," Judge Mansfield found "no
merit" in those arguments in support of the district court's deci-
sion." Primarily, he held that reliance on Robert C. Herd & Co. v.
Krawill Machinery Corp." was misplaced as the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act* "explicitly defines the term 'carrier' and lacks the Arti-
cle 24 requirement that " . . . any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits
set out in this convention."" That is, the Act in Herd has a defini-
tion which does not include agents and does not restrict legal ac-
tions solely to the terms of the act. Likewise, evidence does not
show that Acts-covered carriers are called on to reimburse inde-
pendent agents' employees, as are Convention-governed carriers.
Accordingly, the Court's interpretation in Herd did not operate
to circumvent carrier liability limits and did not "reverse a 40-year
interpretational course of practice. . . '"' Again, the court places
emphasis on the effects of a noninclusive reading of the Conven-
tion.
As a matter of policy in reaching his decision, Judge Mansfield
also asserted that if he did not grant the expanded definition of
"carrier," the entire nature of international air disaster litigation
will be "radically changed" where American airlines were involved,
noting that the liability limitations of the Convention could then be
circumscribed by the simple device of a suit against the pilot or em-
ployees. The corporate carrier would be forced to indemnify against
higher recoveries as the cost of services by key employees. This
cost, of course, would be passed on to the passengers.'
" 555 F.2d at 1092.
'7 Id. To the arguments the airline industry is no longer in need of protection,
and the limitations are too low, arbitrary and inadequate, the court recognized
its duty only to enforce the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.
The court stated: "These arguments misconceive our function. We do not sit to
decide whether laws are no longer necessary. . . .The Warsaw Convention is
not a treaty that has mouldered on the books. On the contrary, it has had agoniz-
ing reappraisal. Id.
88 Id.
8" 359 U.S. 297 (1959). See note 49, supra, and accompanying text.
0046 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970).
1 555 F.2d at 1092.
"2 Id.
13 Id. at 1082.
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The court's refusal to follow Pierre seems justified: though the
case is in point factually, that decision foregoes any analysis of the
framers' intent or of the treaty's purpose and involves only a literal
reading of the Convention's provisions. Whether the court's hesi-
tant reliance on Wanderer or Chutter is justified seems immaterial
due to the same analytical failure found in Pierre. That is, the cases
supporting both parties are irrelevant because they fail to examine
the intent and purposes behind the Convention. The important con-
siderations are those emphasized by the court in Reed: the effects
of a contrary reading on the paying public, the airlines, and their
employees.
Were the limitations not applicable to airline employees, logic
dictates that suits would be brought against the employees in order
to circumvent what would seem to some plaintiffs as inadequate
recoveries. The results necessarily would follow two courses: either
risk-bearing employees would not assume their jobs at such a po-
tential economic hardship (these would be, in most cases, key op-
erational personnel), or the employer, at a higher per passenger
cost, would have to indemnify those employees.
Either course, obviously, does little to protect and promote the
airline industry, an underlying purpose of the Convention. In light
of the results of a contrary reading, and the acknowledged purpose
of the Warsaw Convention, Judge Mansfield's decision appears
correct in its interpretation and analysis. It is rather dubious that
the Convention framers could have considered such a circumven-
tion of the treaty available. Whether a broader reading is also ex-
tended to agents, as opposed to employees, is a question which must
await further judicial consideration.
Stuart W. King
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REMEDIES-IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTION-No Implied Private
Action Exists For a Violation of Safety Regulations Promulgated
by the Federal Aviation Administration Resulting Only in Eco-
nomic Injury. Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452
(3d Cir. 1976).
This action was originally brought in the Federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania' as a class action suit by
the owners of a Cessna aircraft on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated against United Instruments, Inc. (United
Instruments) and Tokyo Aircraft Instrument Company (Tokyo
Aircraft). The plaintiffs' aircraft was equipped with an altimeter
manufactured by Tokyo aircraft and distributed by United Instru-
ments. The Federal Aviation Administration, by directive issued
December 6, 1974, had required the plaintiffs to replace or
modify the altimeter to conform with the Administratior's stand-
ards. This action was brought to recover each plaintiff's cost of
removing, repairing, and reinstalling the defective altimeter, which
cost approximately seventy-five dollars. The district court granted
jurisdiction on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1337,' which gives the
United States District Courts jurisdiction over civil actions arising
under an Act of Congress regulating commerce. The defendants
appealed when the district court included in its order granting
jurisdiction the statement required by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)' for
1 Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1975). For a
full discussion of this decision see 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 625 (1976).
2Airworthiness Directive No. 74-24-13.
' "The district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding
arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and
commerce against restraints and monopolies." 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not other-
wise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal
to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That appli-
cation for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or
a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
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an interlocutory appeal. Held, reversed: An implied right of action
does not exist for a violation of safety regulations promulgated by
the FAA resulting only in economic injury.
The plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to a federal
private remedy based strictly upon a statutory violation. The
basis for the district court's grant of jurisdiction in Rauch was the
implication test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.'
In that case, the Court held that the decision of whether to imply
a private remedy for the violation of a federal statute could be made
on the basis of the answer to four quesions: (1) whether the
plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted;' (2) whether there is any indication of congressional in-
tent to create or deny a private remedy;' (3) whether the implica-
tion of a private remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose
of the legislative scheme;' and (4) whether it would be inappropri-
ate to imply a cause of action based solely on federal law in that
the matter is one traditionally of state concern and the remedy or-
dinarily relegated to the states." This test was primarily a restate-
ment of principles which had previously been employed by the fed-
eral courts,'" except perhaps for the fourth question of whether the
matter is traditionally of state concern." Finding that the matter is
traditionally of state concern tends to limit the implication of reme-
dies by federal courts."'
Three days prior to the district court's grant of jurisdiction in
Rauch, the Third Circuit employed the Cort test in Polansky v.
Transworld Airlines, Inc.'3 In Polansky, the court refused to imply
a private right of action on behalf of passengers who were furnished
5422 U.S. 66 (1975).
' This test was first employed in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916).
7 This test was first employed in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers [Amtrak], 414 U.S. 453 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as [Amtrak]].
This test was employed in [Amtrak], 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
9This test was employed in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963).
10 See McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action:
Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1976).
"Id.
"The Burger court made consistent efforts to reduce the load of the federal
judiciary. Id.
"3 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
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allegedly inferior ground accommodations on a tour sponsored by
a Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated air carrier." The court
based its decision solely on the third and fourth factors of the Cort
test, finding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a private right of
action." The district court in Rauch followed the decision in Polan-
sky insofar as it also applied the third and fourth factors of the Cort
test, but reached a different conclusion, namely, that a federal pri-
vate remedy existed.
As noted, the third factor of the Cort test is whether the implica-
tion of a private remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose
of the legislative scheme. 6 The district court in Rauch decided that
implication was consistent with the legislative scheme. Before reach-
ing this conclusion, however, the court was faced with one of the
most familiar arguments against implication, the doctrine of statu-
tory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius." This doc-
trine provides that where explicit statutory remedies have been pro-
vided, it is inconsistent with the legislative scheme to imply any
further remedies. 6 This doctrine dissuaded another district court,
in Moungey v. Brandt," from implying a remedy for a violation of
the Federal Aviation Act (the Act)." Moungey was an action by
an airplane passenger against the owner of the airplane for injuries
sustained in a collision. The District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin concluded that the national interest in safety in civil
aeronautics was adequately protected by the network of statutory
and administrative remedies created by the federal aviation pro-
gram, and thus no remedy was implied."'
The district court in Rauch was persuaded neither by expressio
unius nor by its application in Moungey and concluded that the ex-
plicit provision of administrative remedies does not of necessity pre-
1' Id.
Id.
16See [Amtrak], 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
' "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 692 (4th ed. 1968).
"See [Amtrak], 414 U.S. at 457-58 (1974).
"250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301
et. seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch.
601, 52 Stat. 973.
" 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
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clude the judicial implication of further remedies."2 The court based
its decision on the advancement of "substantive social policy goals"
embodied in the Act. 3 Unlike the Third Circuit in Polansky, the
district court in Rauch held that authorizing private suits for dam-
ages based on violations of safety regulations would aid in the
clear congressional policy of enhancing safety for passengers."
Having thus disposed of the third question of the Cort test, the
court considered the fourth question of "whether it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law in
that the matter is one traditionally of state concern and the remedy
ordinarily relegated to the states."'" In a rather brief treatment of
the matter, the court decided that it would not be inappropriate and
granted the plaintiffs an implied right of action.2 In order to reach
this conclusion, the court was again faced with the task of dis-
tinguishing the Third Circuit's holding in Polansky."' In Polansky
the court held that "only where there is some countervailing nation-
al interest should the federal courts imply a federal private remedy
when an adequate state remedy already exists."'" In order to avoid
the clear effect of this language upon the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion,"' the district court cited several cases supporting the proposi-
tion that safety in aviation is an area of pervasive national interest
and thus should not be left to the state courts.' The court "respect-
22 405 F. Supp. at 445. The court cited Meyers v. Pennsylvania, 416 U.S. 946,
950 (1974), to support this proposition and quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402-03 n.4 (1971),
stated: "where the primary purpose behind a statute is to promote safety and
save lives, any method of enforcement which will encourage compliance with
its terms should be viewed as consistent with the legislative scheme."
22405 F. Supp. at 445.
', 405 F. Supp. at 445. The court "respectfully disagreed" with the holding in
Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966), which held that im-
plication of a private remedy would not further the statutory purpose.
11See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
2' 405 F. Supp. 442 (1975).
.7 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
21 Id. at 337.
219 Obviously, state remedies were adequate, as the court seems to admit. 405
F. Supp. at 447.
" City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639, 644
(1973); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944); Kohr
v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 747 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Gabel v.
Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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fully disagreed"'" with the decision in Moungey v. Brandt" that
no benefit to the government's air safety program would result from
the implication of a private remedy and concluded that the further-
ance of the primary statutory purpose of providing safety in air
travel justified the implication of a private remedy despite the avail-
ability of adequate state remedies."
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and denied the plaintiffs
a federal remedy.' Its decision was also based on the Cort test but
instead of applying the third and fourth questions of the test, as it
had in Polansky and as the district court had, the Third Circuit re-
lied exclusively on the first and fourth questions of (1) whether the
plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted; and (4) whether it would be inappropriate to imply
a cause of action based solely on federal law in that the matter is
one traditionally of state concern and the remedy ordinarily rele-
gated to the states."
A. The Protected Class
In order to determine whether the plaintiffs were in the class to
be protected, the court examined the legislative history of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act and concluded that the "whole purpose" of the
Act was to create an agency to handle the problems of air safety.'
The court concluded that the especial class protected by section 601
of the Act' consists of all potential passengers or crew members of
civil and military aircraft and those on the ground who might be
endangered by accidents resulting from unsafe aircraft, and further,
that those potential beneficiaries of the Act who have not suffered
any actual injury can never be the intended beneficiaries of an im-
1405 F. Supp. at 446.
3 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
"3 405 F. Supp. at 447.
"This was an appeal from an interlocutory order. The district court included
in its order the statement required by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) for certifica-
tion, thus allowing the plaintiffs to appeal the order immediately before further
proceedings in the district court.
" 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976). For an extended discussion of the first prong
of the Cori test see Piper v. Chris Craft Industries, Inc., - U.S. -, 97 S.Ct.
926 (1977).
"548 F.2d at 457.
3749 U.S.C. § 1421 (1970).
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plied federal cause of action." Contrary to the district court, the
Third Circuit concluded that since it was the primary purpose of
Congress to protect passengers and crew members, it could not
have been the primary purpose of Congress to protect the owners
of aircraft from mere economic loss."
Trying to place themselves in the class to be protected, the plain-
tiffs advanced the argument that there was a "pervasive legislative
scheme" governing their relationship as owners of the aircraft with
the manufacturers of the aircraft appliances similar to the scheme
apparent in section 14(a) of the Securities & Exchange Act of
1934.' Section 14(a) governs the relationship between corporate
management and stockholders in connection with proxy solicita-
tion."' This pervasive legislative scheme prompted the Supreme
Court to imply a remedy on behalf of stockholders for a violation
of proxy solicitation regulations in J.. Case Co. v. Borak."
In Rauch, the court held that if there was a pervasive legislative
scheme, it governed only the relationship between the owners and
manufacturers of aircraft and the passengers and crew members
and that this scheme did not govern the relationship between
owners and manufacturers.' The injury which the Act was intend-
ed to prevent was injury to passengers occasioned by the negligence
of owners and manufacturers, not the economic injury suffered by
owners having to replace defective appliances." Even if the protec-
tion of owners was within the intention of the legislature, the court
held that this does not give the plaintiffs a private right of action
because they were not the primary beneficiaries and thus are not
part of the protected class. This technique of limiting the protected
class to primary beneficiaries only was employed in the leading
case, Cort v. Ash."
B. State Versus Federal Law
The Third Circuit also considered the fourth question of the
31548 F.2d at 457.
31548 F.2d at 458.
40 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
41 Id.
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
43 548 F.2d at 460.
"Id.
"422 U.S. 66 (1975).
19781
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Cort test, which is whether the matter is one ordinarily of state con-
cern and the cause of action one traditionally governed by state
law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a federal cause of ac-
tion." Unlike the district court, the Third Circuit was unimpressed
with the argument that there is a "countervailing national interest"
in aviation, and held that this action is one traditionally of state
concern and should, therefore, be relegated to the state courts.
The court found that the action was based on tort or contract law,
the type of case with which the state courts are familiar and con-
cerning which a large body of state law has already developed.
The Third Circuit rejected the district court's holding that the
plaintiff's claim involved a concern with safety in aviation, a matter
of national interest, holding that this was merely a matter of breach
of contract or warranty, concerning economic injury only." The
national interest in safety was adequately served when the owners
of the aircraft were forced to comply with the FAA directive to
repair the defective altimeter. Once this interest was served, the
court found the cause of action of the owner against the manufac-
turer to be one traditionally of state concern and thus inappropri-
ate for the implication of a federal remedy. The Third Circuit also
rejected the argument that implying a federal private right of action
would serve to deter further violations, noting that the Supreme
Court rejected such a deterrence argument in Cort v. Ash.' With-
out considering whether an implied remedy would help effectuate
the statutory purpose of safety,"1 the court concluded that more evi-




The practical implication of the Third Circuit's decision in
Rauch is that the owners of aircraft are without remedy in the fed-
eral courts for economic injury caused by violations of safety regu-








lations promulgated pursuant to the Act. In addition, the federal
judiciary will not be burdened by the potentially large number of
cases which could have arisen had the court upheld a private reme-
dy. Rauch has demonstrated the potential of the fourth question of
the Cort test to reduce the case load of the federal courts. If fol-
lowed, this opinion means that causes of action based on traditional
state remedies cannot be extended to become federal claims merely
because they are grounded on violations of federal statutes. This
does not mean, however, that there will be a complete ban on pri-
vate remedies implied for violations of the Act. The Third Circuit
expressly excluded from consideration the situation where physical
injury has already occurred."
The court reached the proper conclusion. There is no reason the
plaintiffs need a federal remedy to redress their grievances in this
case. The strongest argument the plaintiffs could make in favor of
implication was that the implication of a private remedy would
serve to deter future violations of the Act, but the plaintiffs never
established that a traditional state remedy would be insufficient to
serve this purpose.
Richard E. Miller
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENTS-The Revision of the National Airport System Plan by the
Secretary of Transportation is a Report on a Proposal for Major
Federal Action Requiring Preparation of an Environmental Im-
pact Statement. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Brock
Adams, Secretary of Transportation, 434 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C.
1977).
Plaintiffs' brought suit seeking a mandatory injunction against
the Secretary of Transportation requiring him to file an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS),' with his revision of the National
"' The court postponed consideration of this situation, and cited several cases
which dealt with this problem. See 548 F.2d 452, 457-58 n.10 (1976).
1 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. and the City of Boston, Mass.
2 Brock Adams.
3 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2) (c) (1970).
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Airport System Plan (revised Plan). The revised Plan was required
to be completed by January 1, 1978' by the Airport and Airway
Development Act of 1970 (AADA).' The AADA requires that
the National Airport System Plan predict the type and estimated
cost of airway development needed to adequately serve the needs
of the United States during the next decade.' The Plan is required to
be sufficiently accurate for use in future appropriations.8
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)' re-
quires that an EIS be prepared concomitant with every proposal
for major federal action.10 The plaintiffs argued that the revised
Plan constituted such a proposal and moved for summary judge-
ment. The defendant 1 contended that the revised Plan would not
sufficiently resemble the implemented Plan to be considered a pro-
posal because many contingencies outside of the defendant's con-
trol effect final implementation of the revised Plan." Held: The
revision of the National Airport System Plan by the Secretary of
Transportation is a proposal for major federal action requiring
preparation of an environmental impact statement. Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Brock Adams, Secretary of Transportation,
434 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1977).
NEPA is an attempt to force fundamental reform in the national
strategy toward management of the environment. 3 By passage of
this act Congress hoped to "assure for all Americans safe, health-
ful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surround-
ings."' At the same time, Congress sought to "achieve a balance
between population and resource use"" and to "enhance the quality
'Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1970
& Supp. V 1975).
549 U.S.C. § 1712(i) (Supp. 1975).
449 U.S.C. § 1701-1762 (1970).
749 U.S.C. § 1712 (1970).
8 49 U.S.C. S 1712(i) (Supp. V 1975).
9 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (1970).
1"42 U.S.C. S 4332(c) (1970).
"1 Brock Adams, Secretary of Transportation.
"Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Adams, 434 F. Supp. 403, 406
(D.D.C. 1977).
1342 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970); F. Anderson, Jr., The National Environmental
Policy Act, FED. ENVT'L L. 239 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Anderson].
1'42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2) (1970).
"42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(5) (1970).
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of renewable resources.""' In order to effectuate such lofty goals,
the provisions of NEPA provide for a Council on Environmental
Quality," charged with development and recommendation of ap-
propriate national policies consistent with NEPA's stated goals.
In addition, NEPA requires the President of the United States to
prepare an annual Environmental Quality Report." More sig-
nificantly, the provisions of NEPA require preparation of an EIS
in certain cases.
An EIS is a detailed statement discussing the environmental
consequences of proposed major federal actions and is required
only if the proposed actions significantly affect the quality of the
human environment." The EIS must consider not only the en-
vironmental impacts, but also the alternatives to the proposed
action, relationships between short term local uses and long term
productivity, and the effects of irretrievable and irreversible com-
mitments of resources should the proposed action be imple-
mented." The federal official responsible for the action determines
if an EIS should be prepared," and if so, it must be completed
when the proposal is submitted for formal legislative or executive
approval." If no EIS has been prepared at that time, or if the pre-
"s42 U.S.C § 4331(b) (6) (1970).
1742 U.S.C. § 4342-4347 (1970); see generally Note, The Council on Environ-
mental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the National Environmental
Policy Act, 23 CATS U.L. REV. 547 (1974). The Council's guidelines have been
held advisory and not mandatory, not having the force of law. See also Sierra
Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 58 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1974);
Continental Ill. Nat. B. & T. Co. of Chicago v. Kleindeinst, 382 F. Supp. 107,
114 (D.C. Ill. 1973); but see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of En-
gineers of U.S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 743-44 (D.C. Ark. 1971), afl'd, 470
F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) (giving guidelines great deference).
s42 U.S.C. S 4341 (1970) requires that the report set forth the status and
condition of major man-made and natural classes of the environment, the current
and foreseeable trends of such classes, the adequacy of available natural resources,
a review of the governmental programs with an impact on the environment, and
recommendations to remedy any deficient programs.
142 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970); see generally Greis, Environmental Impact
Statement: A Small Step Instead of a Giant Leap, 5 UlB. LAw. 264 (1973); Lap-
ping, Environmental Impact Assessment Methodologies: A Critique, 4 ENVT'L
A.Fss. 123 (1975); Felton, NEPA: Full of Sound and Fury ... ? , 6 U. RicH. L.
REV. 116 (1971).
"042 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970); see generally Deutsch, The National Environ-
mental Policy Act's First Five Years, 4 ENVT'L As'. 3, 16 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Deutsch].
"Anderson, supra note 13, at 364.
2 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976).
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pared EIS is considered inadequate, injunctive relief may be
sought.'
The requirement for preparation of an EIS' has been called the
"action-forcing" section of NEPA" and has dominated litigation
concerning NEPA,' producing considerable comment." Much of
the litigiation has focused on what constitutes major federal ac-
tion," or what makes a significant impact on the human environ-
ment." In addition, courts have considered what standard of re-
view is to be used when reviewing the refusal by a federal agency
to prepare an EIS or when reviewing the sufficiency of an EIS."
2'See e.g., Morgan v. United States Postal Service, 405 F. Supp. 413, 424
(D.C. Mo. 1975); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 282 (D.C. Wash. 1972).
'4 The EIS requirement received the term "action forcing section" because it
is the section of NEPA which forces federal agencies to consider environmental
problems. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 20, at 6; S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong.,
1 Sess. 9 (1969); 115 CoNG. REc. 40415, 40419 (1969); Yannacone, Jr., Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENVT'L L. 8 (1970).
"Cases in which courts have been asked to decide if an EIS is required in-
clude: Sadler v. 218 Housing Corp., 417 F. Supp. 348, 357 (D.C. Ga. 1976),
(Housing and Urban Development plans for demolition projects in urban areas);
Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas High-
way Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1974),
(highway projects); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, (9th Cir. 1976), (power
projects); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 21 (D.C. Tex. 1974), (water works
project); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975),
(expansion of airports); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 578
(D.C. Va. 1972), (introduction of the "sretch jet," a Boeing 727-200, into an
airport); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 125 (D.C. Alas. 1971), (issu-
ance of construction permits for a pulp mill); Hanly v. Kleindeinst, 471 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1972), (issuance of construction per-
mits for jail); Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 388 F. Supp.
394, 398 (D.C. Pa. 1975), (issuance of a construction permit for a dam); SCRAP
v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 198-200 (D.D.C. 1972), (approval of a
temporary surcharge to freight tariffs); Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419,
426 (D.C. Conn. 1972), (discharge of waste into navigable waterways); Citizens
for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 788-89 (D.C. Me. 1972), (United
States Marine Corps training exercises).
' See note 19, supra.
27 See Deutsch, supra note 20, at 19; see also F. ANDERSON, JR., NEPA IN
THE COURTS (1973) 275-92; YANNACONE & COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 83-89 (1977 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as YANNACONE & COHEN].
2 Deutsch, supra note 20, at 23-27; YANNACONE & COHEN, supra note 27, at
84-89.
"The standard of review has been held to be the arbitrary and capricious
standard in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). This standard had been
previously adopted by the Second Circuit in Hanly v. Kleindeinst, 471 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1972). In so deciding, the Supreme
Court in Kleppe settled an issue over which the various circuits were sharply
divided.
CASE NOTES
Courts, however, have paid little attention to what constitutes a
"recommendation or a report on a proposal."'
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Adams" was the first case
to attempt to define "proposal." Judge Sirica in Adams relied on
the holding in Kleppe v. Sierra Club"' to determine at what point,
along the continuum between the original genesis of an idea and
its implementation, a court may enjoin a project pending prepara-
tion of an EIS.
Kleppe was a landmark holding that narrowed those circum-
stances in which an EIS is required. In Kleppe, the Department of
Interior was issuing coal leases and right of ways in order to devel-
op federally owned or controlled coal reserves.' The plaintiffs' in
Kleppe urged that preparation of a regional EIS dealing with the
environmental impacts to the area known as the Northern Great
Plains region of these federal activities was required.' The Court,
however, decided that a regional EIS was not required because no
project was proposed which dealt exclusively with the Northern
Great Plains region.' The Court said that the only projects pro-
posed were either for action on a local scale, not including the en-
tire region, or for nationwide action encompassing far more than
just the region.'. Consideration of the environmental consequences
to the region, therefore, should be considered in both the EIS deal-
ing with the local project and the EIS dealing with the national pro-
ject.3" Because there was no regional proposal, there could be no
' See generally Deutsch, supra note 20.
"1434 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1977).
82427 U.S. 390 (1976). In Kleppe the Supreme Court interpreted its 1975
holding in Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975),
that an EIS is not required until such time as a "proposal" is made.
427 U.S. at 395.
"
4 Plaintiffs, several environmental organizations, brought suit on behalf of
themselves and their members. Standing to do so may be granted if members
are "users" of the affected area and will therefore be injured by implementation
of the proposed agency action; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972);
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973); Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d
786 (9th Cir. 1975).
35 427 U.S. at 395.
36 Id. at 400-401.
3T Id. at 399.
11 Id. at 399-400. The local actions included issuance of leases and right-of-way
pemits and approval of mining plans. The Coal Programmatic EIS was prepared
together with the national coal-leasing program.
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regional EIS.3'
The plaintiff in Kleppe asserted and the court of appeals agreed
that even though not formally recommended, a regional plan had
been contemplated by the Department of Interior in addition to
the local and national programs.' Therefore, plaintiffs argued, an
EIS dealing with the contemplated regional plan was required prior
to formal recommendation."' The Court answered by stating that
only when a proposal is formally submitted for legislative or execu-
tive approval without an appropriate EIS may a court intervene
and order preparation of an EIS.' Implicit is a recognition. that the
purpose of judicial review of such agency decisions was to insure
the agency had carefully considered the environmental consequen-
ces.'
Thus, the Court in Kleppe attempted to determine when an EIS
should be prepared, but in doing so, it created new definitional
problems. It appears from Kleppe that contemplation of a project
is not sufficient to give rise to the EIS requirement, regardless of
the likelihood of implementation." A recommendation or a report
on a proposal must be formally submitted for approval before an
EIS is required. ' The Court in Kleppe, however, left undefined the
phrase "recommendation or a report on a proposal."
Judge Sirica determined that the issue in Adams" was whether
the revised Plan required by AADA was a "proposal" for major
federal action for purposes of NEPA and application of the EIS
requirements." Defendant conceded that the revised Plan would




Id. at 405-406. In so stating, the Court expressly rejected a balancing of
factors to determine when an EIS was required; see infra, note 60.
43 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838
D.C. Cir. 1972). The Court in Kleppe noted that questions of environmental im-
pacts are often highly technical questions best dealt with by the federal agencies
with their considerable expertise and, therefore, courts should be extremely cau-
tious to substitute their judgment for that of federal agencies.
4427 U.S. at 406.
5Id.
"434 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1977).
4 7 d. at 407.
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question that it would be a major federal action." Defendant did
argue, however, that the revised Plan was not a recommendation
or a report for which an EIS is required.' He argued that too many
contingencies outside his control stood between the revised Plan as
conceived and the revised Plan as implemented to make it a propos-
al.* Defendant explained that before implementation of the revised
Plan would occur, several things might happen which were not
present in other contexts in which an EIS might be required. 1 First,
application for planning grants might be received from local air-
port administrators or planners." These grants are used to finance
research and development of construction or expansion projects."
If the project appears feasible, then application may be made for
a development grant which is used to finance the actual construc-
tion.' The research could indicate that the original idea is not feas-
ible in its current state and must be either revamped or eliminated
altogether. As a result of this process, the project as implemented
might vary substantially from the project described in the revised
Plan."
An additional contingency which may alter the revised Plan is
the requirement for annual funding for the Plan by Congress.' If
Congress refuses to appropriate sufficient funds, projects may never
be implemented.' If the revised Plan is not implemented as formu-
18 Id. at 406. This is obviously a major federal action since 49 U.S.C. §
1714(b) (1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) authorizes the Secretary to incur obligations
not to exceed 1.46 billion dollars over a five year period. It clearly has significant
impact on the environment, as Congress has specifically required the Secretary
to consult with various federal officials responsible for preservation of the en-
vironment and implement their recommendations if feasible. 49 U.S.C. S 1712(f)
(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
49 1 d. at 406.
50 Id. at 407.
'
11 d.
5249 U.S.C. § 1713 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); See generally 41 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 550 (1975).
3 Id. Planning grants are designed to promote effective location and develop-
ment of airports in furtherance of the Plan.
8449 U.S.C. § 1714 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); development grants may be used
for land acquisition or for the construction, improvement, or repair of an airport.
"3 434 F. Supp. 403, 407 (D.D.C. 1977).
-49 U.S.C. § 1714 (1970); funding was provided in the original act until
1975. Thereafter, Congress is required to pass new legislation.
" An additional problem may be caused by a larger number of applications
than was expected. See City of Los Angeles v. Coleman, 397 F. Supp. 547
(D.D.C. 1975).
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lated, the revision will have proved to be little more than a starting
point for discussion and not a proposal for major federal action.
Defendant argued, in effect, that the revised Plan was no more than
a statement of intention pursuant to which future proposals would
be presented."
Judge Sirica rejected Defendant's arguments, concluding that
the revised Plan was a proposal.' In doing so, he set forth a two
pronged test required by Kleppe, as he interpreted that case."*
(1) The document must contain a "proposal"-that is, a goal
toward which the responsible federal official intends to direct
his energies ...
(2) The proposal must have well enough defined geographic,
temporal, and subject matter limits so that the official can
meaningfully address the questions posed in 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2) (c)."
While Judge Sirica propounded this standard, he did not apply it
during his analysis of the case. Instead, he considered the alleged
contingencies and concluded that they were not likely to have a
significant impact on the implementation of the revised Plan."'
Judge Sirica's method of analysis implicitly considered the ques-
tion: Was the planning of the project to a point that significant
change was unlikely? In concluding that it was, Judge Sirica point-
ed out that the revised Plan was, in large part, based on the needs
of the localities as they, themselves, perceived those needs.' Given
11434 F. Supp. at 407.
"Id.
aId. at 406. The Supreme Court, however, rejected a test used by Judge
Skelly Wright who, writing for the court of appeals in Kleppe, suggested four
questions which should be considered:
1) How likely is the program to come to fruition, and how soon
will that occur?
2) To what extent is meaningful information presently available
on the effects of implementation of the program, and of alterna-
tives and their effects?
3) To what extent are irretrievable commitments being made and
options precluded as refinement of the proposal progresses?
4) How severe will be the environmental effects if the program is
implemented?
514 F.2d 856, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Cf. the dissenting opinion of Justice. Mar-
shall who endorsed Judge Wright's four factor test at 427 U.S. 415.




that, it was unlikely that they would deviate from the revised Plan."'
Additionally, Judge Sirica cited the highly attractive subsidies to
municipalities provided through AADA as substantial incentives
to implement the revised Plan as it exists."
While the conclusion reached in Adams is appropriate in light
of the policies of NEPA," the standard suggested by Judge Sirica,
is not required by the Kleppe case, and does not conform to that
holding. The first part of the test, the definition of proposal,"" is too
broad to comply with the Kleppe standard when standing alone.
When applied to the facts in Adams, the potential for overreach
in the definition becomes apparent. In Adams, the defendant pub-
lished a document which contained a goal-airport development-
towards which he intended to direct his energies. Using Judge
Sirica's definition of proposal, that alone was sufficient to require
an EIS. The possible contingencies involved would not be relevant.
The Supreme Court's holding in Kleppe indirectly rejects such a
definition stating: "A court has no authority to.. . determine a
point during the germination process of a potential proposal at
which an impact statement should be prepared.""
While the second half of Judge Sirica's standard" appears to
respond to this statement by the Supreme Court, it fails under anal-
ysis. A federal official may have developed a "potential proposal"
to the point that it is sufficiently limited in terms of subject matter
for him to respond in an EIS analysis and yet still be within the
"germination process." A logical conclusion from the above analy-
sis is that the official preparing the statement must be willing to
urge an irretrievable commitment to the project. Not until then
"Id.
"Id.
" Few clear trends have emerged from the six years of litigation NEPA has
provoked. See Deutsch, supra note 20 at 18; ANDERSON, NEPA IN THM COURTS
275-292 (1973). The observation has been made, however, that on close issues,
courts seem to favor requiring preparation of an EIS. ANDERSON, Id. at 279.
This is consistent with the language of NEPA stating that federal officials shall
comply with the requirements contained therein to the "fullest extent possible."
42 U.S.C. S 4332 (1970); See generally S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
and 115 CONG. REc. 40415 (1969) for part of the legislative history. Moreover,
AADA requires consideration of environmental factors, although not to the same
degree that NEPA requires with an EIS.
07434 F. Supp. 406.
08427 U.S. 406 (emphasis in original).
09434 F. Supp. 406.
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will the "germination process" be complete. To suggest that the
project must have sufficiently defined limits to allow a meaningful
EIS begs the question of when that occurs.
The actual analysis used by Judge Sirica in Adams suggests a
different standard than the one propounded by him which may well
conform to tests required by Kleppe. Judge Sirica considered the
alleged contingencies which might affect the final implementation
of the revised Plan and decided that they were not likely to sig-
nificantly alter that final implementation."0 As previously suggested,
Judge Sirica implicitly considered whether the planning of the pro-
ject was to a point that significant change was unlikely."' That stan-
dard would seem to comport with the holding in Kleppe, whereas
the tests suggested by Judge Sirica do not." When change is unlike-
ly, it is logical to assume that the "germination process" is complete
and also, that the official is now ready to urge an irretrievable com-
mitment to the project.
While the proffered standard by Judge Sirica does not conform
to the Kleppe holding and should therefore not be used, his opinion
suggests a standard which does adhere to Kleppe when the project
under attack is assailed as not being sufficiently complete as to sub-
ject matter to actually constitute a proposal. The proper inquiry be-
comes whether the planning of the project has reached a point at
which significant change is unlikely. Assuming that the responsible
official is also ready to urge an irretrievable commitment to the
project, then it is properly characterized as a proposal under
NEPA."
Thomas J. Terkel
70 Id. at 407.
71 Id.
"' This test does not overstep the Kleppe limits in that it is addressed solely to
whether a proposal has yet been formulated. Judge Wright's test, see note 60,
supra, failed because the first factor was the only one which addressed the issue
of whether a proposal had yet been formulated. To that extent, the focus of the
entire standard was misplaced.
3 The case was not appealed by the government which, through a spokesman
from the Justice Department, explained that its failure to appeal should not
be considered indicative of acquiescence. It would appear that the pressing time
element, (AADA required submission of the revised Plan by January 1, 1978),
combined with the preliminary stage of the litigation, (the appeal would have
been taken from a judgment granting a motion for summary judgment) played
a significant role in the government's decision.
CASE NOTES
PRODUCT LIABILITY-DAMAGE TO THE PRODUCT ITSELF-
When a Defect in a Product Causes Damage Only to the Product
Itself, the Resulting Loss Is an Economic Loss Not Recoverable
Under the Tort Concept of Strict Product Liability. Mid Continent
Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc., 21 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 481 (July 12, 1978).
Bobby Shivers, doing business as Shivers Flying Service, ac-
quired a wrecked single engine aircraft for repair and sale. Shivers
repaired the airframe, and Robert D. Hawkins, under contract to
Shivers, repaired the engine. Shivers sold the repaired aircraft
"as is" to Mid Continent Aircraft Corporation (Mid Continent),
who resold it "as is" to Curry County Spraying Service (Curry).
When Curry had clocked approximately thirty hours of engine
time, the engine quit in flight during a spraying operation. The
resulting forced landing caused several thousand dollars damage
to the fuselage and wings, but no damage to any other property,
and no personal injury to the pilot.
Curry brought action against Mid Continent, Shivers, and Haw-
kins for, inter alia, the cost of repairing the aircraft. Curry based
the action on implied warranties of merchantability and fitness, on
negligence in failing to discover and correct or warn of the defect,
and on strict liability in tort for an unreasonably dangerous defect
in the engine.
The trial court decreed that Curry and its insurer recover
jointly and severally from Mid Continent, Hawkins, and Shivers
not only for repair costs but also for the cost of renting a replace-
ment aircraft while repairs were being made. The liability of
Hawkins was grounded in negligence, while the liability of Mid
Continent and Shivers was based on strict liability. Only Mid
Continent appealed the judgement. The Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals affirmed, holding that damage to a product caused by a de-
fect in the product itself is within the protection of modem strict
product liability, and further, that merely by conditioning a sale
upon acceptance of an "as is" provision, the seller has not avoided
this strict liability. Again, Mid Continent perfected its appeal;
1 Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry Spraying Service, Inc., 552 S.W.2d
935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977), rev'd, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 481 (July 12,
1978).
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this time to the Texas Supreme Court. Held, reversed: When a
defect in a product causes damage only to the product itself, the
resulting loss is an economic loss not recoverable under the tort
concept of strict product liability. Mid Continent Aircraft Corp.
v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc., 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 481
(July 12, 1978).
The exact extent of coverage under the strict product liability
concept, set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section
402A' [hereinafter referred to as Section 402A], has yet to be
determined. The existence of doctrinal interstices within the con-
cept is hardly surprising, in light of the relative infancy of this
strict product liability approach. Although the concept of strict
liability in the abstract is not new," its application in the modern
sense did not begin until 1962.' Since that time a large majority
of states has embraced the concept.!
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Special Liability of Seller
of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is sub-
ject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
3 Dean Prosser traces strict liability in food cases to the year 1431. Prosser,
Assault on the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1104 (1960).
"Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
5 Since strict product liability was adopted in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc., in 1962, at least thirty-eight states have either adopted 402A or an ap-
proach substantially similar to it. They are as follows:
1965: Illinois, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I11. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965); Kentucky, Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d
441 (Ky. 1965); Michigan, Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich.
85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); New Jersey, Santor v. A and M Karagheu-
sian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
1966: Mississippi, State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Ohio, Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.,
6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Pennsylvania, Webb v. Zern,
422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Tennessee, Ford Motor Company v.
Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966);
1967: Oregon, Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967);
Texas, McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967);
Wisconsin, Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967);
1968: Arizona, 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968);
1969: Alaska, Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska
1969); Minnesota, Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169
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Modem strict tort liability had as its first concern, and today
has as its primary concern, physical injury to the plaintiff himself.
At the other end of the spectrum lies the purely economic losses
such as disappointment of the expectancy interest and lost profits,
about which there is uniform agreement that no recovery lies in
strict tort liability.' The area between these two extremes causes
considerable trouble, with the courts often stumbling over semantics
while attempting to sort the equities. The issue of the degree
of coverage afforded by Section 402A where there is no bodily
injury to the plaintiff, and the only property damage occurring
is to the defective product itself, is one of the troublesome ques-
tions in this area.' It has been squarely met in only a few juris-
N.W.2d 587 (1969); New Hampshire, Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons,
Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Washington, Ulmer v. Ford
Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969);
1970: Connecticut, Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970);
Hawaii, Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240
(1970); Indiana, Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App.
106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970); Iowa, Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Nevada, Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp.,
86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970); Vermont, Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d
44 (2d Cir. 1970);
1971: Louisiana, Weber v. Fid. & Cas. Ins. Co. of New York, 259 La. 599, 250
So.2d 754 (1971); Nebraska, Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428,
191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Rhode Island, Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co.,
109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971);
1972: New Mexico, Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972);
1973: Colorado, Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 33 Colo.
App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973); Montana, Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor
Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); New York, Codling v. Paglia,
32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); South Dakota,
Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Utah, Julander
v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1973);
1974: Idaho, Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974);
Missouri, Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974); Okla-
homa, Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974);
1976: Alabama, Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala. 1976);
Florida, West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Mary-
land, Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976);
1977: Ohio, Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267
(1977).
'See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (Plaintiff injured due to defect in a power tool).
"See Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic
Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1966).
'See generally 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LI-
ABILITY S 4:21 (2d ed. 1974).
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dictions, with no unanimity of opinion." A few courts have dis-
allowed strict tort recovery regardless of whether the damage suf-
fered was due to the mere discovery of a defect in the product, or
rather, to a defect in a part of the product which in tum caused
damage to the remainder.'" Other courts indicate an inclination
I Included in the courts which have explicitly sanctioned recovery for damage
to the product itself are Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1953) (Damage to product itself recoverable under strict liability),
and Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1976) (Inclusion of
damage to the product sold said to be "wiser view").
Among the courts which have expressed a disinclination toward allowing re-
covery are the following: Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546,
209 N.W.2d 643 (1973) (Property damage held not to be within scope of strict
products liability where scaffolding self-destruction caused by defect in scaffold-
ing); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga.App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602
(1975) (Damage to product itself not contemplated as interest protected by prod-
ucts liability negligence rule); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80
(Fla. 1976) (Strict liability held to be applicable only where the defective product
causes injury to a human being).
Where the question has arisen only as part of a collateral issue, the courts
have been inclined to allow recovery. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (Implicit that damage to truck recoverable in strict li-
ability where the truck's brakes had failed); Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246
Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966) (Damage to automobile in fire caused
by defect in wiring of the automobile held recoverable in strict liability); Kassab
v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968) (Dicta indicating that product
itself no different from other property of plaintiff within 402A); MacDougall v.
Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969) (Implicit that
steering defect in auto gives rise to recovery in strict liability for damage to the
auto); Brownell v. White Motor Corp., 260 Or. 251, 490 P.2d 184 (1971) (Im-
plicit that damage to truck recoverable in strict liability where truck ran off road-
way because of defect in the truck); Kleve v. General Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d
568 (Iowa 1973) (Implicit that damage to auto caused by defect recoverable
where the plaintiff was also physically injured); Southwire Co. v. Beloit Eastern
Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D.Pa. 1974) (Interpreting Pennsylvania law, im-
plicit that damage to "tubular strander" caused by a defect in it would have been
recoverable had the other conditions of 402A been met); Forsyth v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1975) (Interpreting Oregon law, implicit
that damage to aircraft itself recoverable in strict liability where crash landing
necessitated by faulty landing gear); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska
1977) (Expressed that damage to a mobile home caused by a defect in the mobile
home is recoverable within the meaning of 402A).
There is conflicting authority within the state of Georgia. Long Mfg., N.C.,
Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga.App. 320, 231 S.E.2d 105 (1976) (Disallow-
ing recovery for damage to the defective product); Mike Bajalia v. Amos Constr.
Co., 142 Ga.App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664 (1977) (Allowing recovery for damage to
the defective product).
"
0 See, e.g., Air Products and Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206
N.W.2d 414 (Wis. 1973), where the court stated:
Mhe trial court reasoned that before a cause of action for strict
liability could be started .... it must be alleged that the defective
product actually caused physical harm to property of the plaintiff,
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toward allowing recovery in either case.1 Still others have made
a distinction, allowing recovery in the latter case but not in the
former." In Texas the issue had not previously arisen, although
some cases contained dicta which indicated sympathy with the con-
cept of allowing the recovery."
The non-resolution of the product-damage question has been
affected by at least two considerations. First, the tort-contract
dichotomy in the development of the concept of strict liability
has rendered this an area which some believe is better governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code.' This approach is particularly
and that the property harmed must be property other than itself;
to put it another way, the complaint must set forth damages for
something other than pure economic loss.
Id. at 425 (emphasis in original). The court relied on the Pennsylvania law re-
view comment which defined economic loss as the "diminution in value of the
product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general pur-
poses for which it was manufactured and sold." See note 7 supra, at 541.
"See, e.g., A-Leet Leasing Corp. v. Kingshead Corp., 150 N.J. Super. 384,
375 A.2d 1208, 1210, (App. Div. 1977) (The liability of a manufacturer for
economic losses, as opposed to personal injury or property damage, said to be
possible under strict tort liability). See also Santor v. A and M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (Seller of carpet held strictly liable for
consumer's cost where carpeting proved to be defective).
"The court in Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977), drew a
fairly logical distinction, relying on Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917 (1966). "[W]e note that sudden and ca-
lamitous damage will almost always result in direct property damage and that
deterioration, internal breakage and depreciation will be considered economic
loss." 563 P.2d at 251.
"Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 455 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [lst Dist.] 1970, no writ) (While denying recovery for defects in
a trailer, the court added, in response to motions for rehearing, "In the ab-
sence of evidence from which it can be inferred that defects in existence when
the trailer was sold by the manufacturer caused physical harm to the trailer, as
opposed to economic loss to the purchaser, the doctrine of strict liability is not
applicable .. " Id. at 828); 0. M. Franklin Serum Co. v. C. A. Hoover & Son,
418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967) (Extended strict liability protection to the property
of the ultimate consumer generally). But see Thermal Supply of Texas, Inc. v.
Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no writ) (The doctrine of
strict liability in tort held not to apply to purely economic losses).
14 See, e.g., Sales and Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14
Hous. L. REV. 1, 143 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sales and Perdue]; Hiigel v.
General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 990 (Colo. 1976) (dissenting opinion);
Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
Also see generally, Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines:
Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort,
19 RuTrERs L. REV. 692 (1965); Comment, Manufacturer's Responsibility for
Defective Products: Continuing Controversy Over the Law To Be Applied, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1681 (1966).
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well-grounded where the parties are business persons in a commer-
cial setting, rather than the merchant "engaged in the business of
selling" and the unsuspecting "consumer" which Section 402A
seems to envision.'" Second, the issue simply has not been litigated.
Not only are equipment problems normally covered by the highly
refined manufacturers' warranties, but also the self-destruction of
a piece of machinery is just not as fertile ground for litigation as
is, for example, the loss of, or the impairment of, anatomical ap-
pendages by the more "fortunate" personal injury plaintiff.
If a decision is made that product damage is within the ambit
of Section 402A coverage, a court will still likely be faced with
a defense such as disclaimer of warranties. Notwithstanding the
judicial disapproval of disclaimers of liability found in Henning-
sen v. Bloomfiel Motors, Inc.," in a commercial transaction be-
tween parties of comparable bargaining power, it is not deemed
unreasonable that they should be allowed to negotiate the alloca-
tion of risk and liability." Section 402A is explicit, however, in
stating that it is not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code
nor affected by limitations on scope and content of warranties."'
Two cases tried in federal court represent current judicial think-
ing on the topic. In the first, Keystone Aeronautics Corporation v.
R. J. Enstrom Corporation," a buyer of used helicopters sued his
"See note 2 supra.
1832 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
" See generally, McNichols, Who Says That Strict Tort Disclaimers Can
Never Be Effective? The Courts Cannot Agree, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 494 (1975);
Sales and Perdue, supra note 14, at 84-88; and Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 974 (1966). See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238
Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J.
Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974); and Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co.,
133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (Law Div. 1975).
18 Comment m to 402A states, in part,
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of
the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code,
as to warranties; and it is not affected by limitations on the scope
and content of warranties, or by limitation to "buyer" and "seller"
in those statutes .... The consumer's cause of action does not de-
pend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom
he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer
or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and his im-
mediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into
the consumer's hands.
19499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
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seller. One of the purchased helicopters sustained substantial dam-
age during a crash landing occasioned, according to Keystone, by a
defect in the helicopter. Keystone brought an action grounded in
negligence, and in strict liability under Section 402A. The war-
ranty exclusion, besides declaring the sale to be "'as is'" without
warranties," also provided that "[t]he R. J. Enstrom Corporation
will be held harmless of any liability in connection with this sale." '
This was held not to express the clarity of intent necessary to ex-
culpate Enstrom from either strict liability or negligence under
Pennsylvania law."1 The second case, Sterner Aero AB v. Page
Airmotive, Inc.,' involved damage to an aircraft resulting from
engine failure on takeoff. The warranty on the aircraft stating
that it was "expressly in lieu of any and all other warranties or
representations express or implied"' was held inadequate, under
Oklahoma law, to relieve Page from liability in negligence. As to
Sterner's action in strict liability, the court ruled that Comment m
to Section 402A"' precluded any defense based on a contractual
disclaimer.'
Nevertheless, sellers are allowed more freedom when dealing
with commercial entities than when dealing with consumers. In
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co.," a malfunctioning
nose wheel caused extensive damage to the aircraft which Douglas
had sold to plaintiff Delta. Douglas, in defense of the action in ne-
gligence and implied warranty, relied on exculpatory language in
the sale contract which expressly negated implied warranty and
negligence as basis for recovery. In holding for Douglas, the court
drew a contrast between the plaintiff Delta and the more vulnerable
"consumer" plaintiff protected by the recent judicial disfavor of
exculpatory clauses and disclaimers."7 This reasoning seems equally
20 Id. at 148.
11 Id. at 150.
22 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974).
23 1d. at 711.
2" See note 18 supra for the text of Comment m.
ISterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir.
1974).
20238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
27 Said the court,
Delta, bargaining for the purchase and delivery of an airplane yet
to be built, is hardly the painwracked sufferer seeking admission to
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applicable to strict tort liability. While other recent cases generally
support the Delta Air Lines case with similar holdings," perhaps
the most succinct statement to date concerning the disclaiming
of Section 402A liability was made by the Oregon Supreme Court.
In K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Company," that court said,
Comment m. to Restatement (Second) §402A was meant to ex-
plain that such garden variety disclaimers were not sufficient to
disclaim the strict liability established by 402A because 402A was
not based on warranty. It means simply that a disclaimer of "war-
ranties" is not sufficient to affect strict liability in tort.30
The Oregon court then proceeded to hold that an unambiguous
limitation of liability between. parties, once again, of equal bar-
gaining power, was not invalid as circumventing 402A.
In Texas, even as the Supreme Court approached consideration
of Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry Spraying Service, Inc.,"
the jurisprudence of the state was resounding the effect of three
other product liability decisions of the court. The first, General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins,' saw the court fashion product misuse
into a partial defense to a strict product liability action, using a
principle of comparative causation.' The second, General Motors
Corp. v. Simmons, ' found a right to contribution among tort-
feasors whose liabilities are grounded respectively, in strict liability
and fault-based torts.' The third, Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc.
the hospital . . . it was not faced . . . with an industry wide stock
contract not open to negotiation; it is not now faced with a "fine
print" clause not known to it when it signed the contract; and it
did not stand as a single inexperienced individual purchaser vis-a-vis
with a large seller relatively indifferent to the making or not making
of a single purchase.
47 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
28 See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975)
(Held that in Illinois less specificity required in commercial transactions than
in consumer dealings in order to effect a limitation of liability for negligence);
Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (Exculpatory clause in negligence upheld absent a showing "that these
giant industrial organizations were of unequal bargaining power." Id. at 525).
"1541 P.2d 1378 (Or. 1976).
301d. at 1381.
3' 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 481 (July 12, 1978).
32 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
33Id. at 349.
-' 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
3 Id. at 862.
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v. Shivers,' declared that strict liability does not apply to mere
economic losses, as opposed to physical damage." These decisions
effect a substantial reduction in the potential liability of a Section
402A defendant. This reduction may have been premised in part on
a need for simplification and reduction of coextensive coverage
by the various bases of product liability.'
That the court took its opportunity in Mid Continent to further
reduce the perimeter of 402A liability thus came as no surprise.
It defined the problem presented by the case as simply "whether in-
jury to the product itself is a type of loss that requires contract
language explicitly allocating the loss to the buyer before the
seller can avoid liability,"'" or whether a general contract of pur-
chase "as is" should "be sufficient to place the loss on the buyer.'"
After noting the wide split of authority on the issue, the court made
brief mention of various cases of import, including Keystone Aero-
nautics"' and Sterner Aero.'3 The court's actual reasoning, however,
seemed to center on the historical role of Section 402A in relation
to that of the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code.'
Since Section 402A arose "to compensate consumers for personal
injuries," and damage to the product itself is "essentially a loss
of the benefit of the bargain," the court found such a loss to be
mere economic loss." Because the "as is" terms of the sale elim-
inated any possibility of recovery in implied warranty,' and because
Mid Continent had not been found negligent by the trial court,
recovery could only be had in strict tort liability. However, since
Nobility Homes held that 402A does not include liability for pure
1557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
37 Id. at 80.
"According to Dean Page Keeton, "Products liability law has become un-
necessarily complex, primarily because recovery for a particular kind of loss may
often be obtained under three separate theories: negligence in tort, strict liability
in tort, and strict liability for breach of warranty." Keeton, Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1,
1 (1978).
1121 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 482.
40 Id.
"499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
'499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974).
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economic loss,' respondent Curry was in short order found to be
without remedy."
The significance of the court's holding that strict liability does
not lie for damage to the product itself can best be considered in
terms of the opinions of the lower court and the dissent in the Su-
preme Court, which directs attention to the Pandora's box of in-
consistencies leading to, and resulting from, a contrary holding.
The lower court, in holding damage to the product itself to be
within Section 402A, relied in part on Santor v. A and M Karag-
heusian, Inc.,"8 a New Jersey decision." In doing so, it made the
wrong decision for the wrong reason. Karagheusian created a strict
liability doctrine conceptually alien to the Section 402A "unreason-
ably dangerous" approach. A carpet seller was held strictly liable
for the cost of certain defectively woven carpet which he had sold
to the plaintiff. The court found liability arising from the mere
presence of the carpeting on the market." Although the Karagheus-
ian court quoted at length from Greenman v. Yuba Power Pro-
ducts, Inc.," the California decision which set the pace in applying
strict liability to dangerously defective goods, Karagheusian no-
where made reference to any dangerous quality in the carpeting."
Texas, on the other hand, has never had a strict tort liability theory
except of the Section 402A variety." Thus any reliance on Karag-
heusian is tenuous at best, a fact recognized by the court in Nobility
46 557 S.W.2d at 80.
"21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 484.
"Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc., 553
S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977), rev'd, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
481 (July 12, 1978).
" Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
10207 A.2d at 312.
"59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
52 In Seely v. White Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965), the California Supreme Court chided the New Jersey court for misapply-
ing the Greenman strict liability approach. "Only if someone had been injured
because the rug was unsafe for use would there have been any basis for imposing
strict liability in tort." 403 P.2d at 151.
" Section 402A was expressly embraced by the Texas courts in McKisson v.
Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967), in which the court said, "In-
sofar as foodstuffs for human consumption are concerned, this section [402A]
states the law as followed in Texas. We are further of the opinion that as a logi-
cal proposition the rule ... should be held applicable to defective products which
cause physical harm to persons." Id. at 789 (citations omitted).
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Homes." The Mid Continent dissenting opinion avoided entirely
the Karagheusian inconsistency. Relying instead on the specific
words of 402A, the dissent reasoned:
The majority opinion adds a word to the existing rule and to
section 402A by requiring that the physical harm be to "other"
property. Section 402A does not contain that limitation. It says
that strict liability applies when there is "physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property ....
That a product, although defective, nevertheless is property of the
consumer is obvious. Said the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "[T]he
defective product itself is as much 'property' as any other possession
of the plaintiff that is damaged as a result of the manufacturing
flaw."" The fact neglected by the Pennsylvania court, as well as
by the Mid Continent dissent, is that the adoption of Section 402A
is for the most part judge-made law." As such, its interpretation,
expansion, and limitation depends only upon the interpretations
given it by the courts. A policy decision is involved in determining
whether the Uniform Commercial Code should have sole authority
over this area of the sale of goods, or if the strict tort concept
should be retained as an additional tool.' This decision should be
made consciously after study of the various jurisprudential con-
siderations in the particular jurisdiction, rather than by black letter
adherence to a standard which at worst may be arbitrary, and at
best is artificially self-imposed.
The Texas Supreme Court has now made that policy decision.
In holding that damage to the product itself does not fall within
Section 402A, the court set policy in favor of simplicity and pre-
dictability, and against ambiguity and duplicative remedies. De-
termining just what was the "product" will generally be straight-
forward." This done, the plaintiff can categorize his losses according
"557 S.W.2d at 79.
21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 486 (emphasis in the opinion).
Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848, 854-55 n.7 (1968).
"See, e.g., Sales and Perdue, supra note 14, at 1-25; W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 98 (4th ed. 1971).
"See Keeton, Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1978).
5' There certainly will arise situations requiring judicial clarification, such as
when all the component parts (each a product) of a larger machine (itself argu-
ably a product) are purchased from the same vendor. The courts may be re-
quired to determine on a case-by-case method whether 402A will apply when for
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to whether they involved the product, his other property, or per-
sonal injury. Losses concerning the product itself, whether due to
conspicuous failure resulting from a defect, or diminution in
value due to the mere existence of the defect,"0 will be governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code and policed by the fault based
torts. Losses relating to other property and personal injury will
retain those remedies while receiving added judicial protection
in the form of Section 402A strict liability.
The state of affairs in Texas is not, however, without some seri-
ous uncertainty after Mid Continent. The express holding in the
case is limited in its terms' to transactions between commercial
entities, and to situations in which absolutely no injury occurred
to persons or property other than the product." In view of consumer
protection arising not only from the Uniform Commercial Code
and fault based torts, but also from deceptive trade practices lawse
and federal warranty legislation, ' the extension of the holding in
this case to consumer transactions seems logical but not at all
certain. Of greater concern than the consumer protection question,
moreover, is the implication that, in cases where there is damage
other than to the product itself, the product damage may be folded
back into the general recovery possible under Section 402A. In
a bit of disturbing dicta in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil
Products," a companion case to Mid Continent, the Texas Supreme
Court indicated that where the product causes damage to other
property, the product has become an "accident risk," and as such
is properly includable in property damage, rather than economic
example a component causes damage to another component. See generally Signal
Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 472 (July 12, 1978).
"The court drew no distinction between these two kinds of damage.
121 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 483.
62 See, e.g., Belobaba, Unfair Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and Sub-
stance in Consumer Protection, 15 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 327 (1977); and Com-
ment, Breach of Warranty and Treble Damages under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 395 (1976).
6 See generally, Strasser, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: An Overview and
Comparison with UCC Coverage, Disclaimer, and Remedies in Consumer War-
ranties, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1111 (1975); and Note, Consumer Product Warran-
ties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the Uniform Commercial Code,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1977).
"21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 472, 475 (July 12, 1978).
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loss." If by this the court meant to announce that any non-product
damage is sufficient to remove the product damage from the cate-
gory of economic loss, then the rule embraced in Mid Continent is
fraught with inconsistency and difficulty of application. It seems
inconceivable that Mid Continent's Section 402A liability for dam-
age to the aircraft could turn on whether the Curry pilot managed
also to break his wristwatch in the forced landing." Yet, this seems
to be the logical extension of the Signal Oil dictum. Unquestion-
ably the Mid Continent dissent did not place such a paradoxical
interpretation on the majority holding,"7 and the scholarly writing
upon which the court relied certainly does not require it."' Never-
theless, only time and litigation will tell whether the court will
choose to confirm the unsettling implications of Signal Oil.
Assuming that the Mid Continent holding may be taken in its
broader sense, the Texas court's determination that damage to
the product itself is economic damage not within Section 402A
is eminently reasonable. Instead of leaving its lower courts another
series of questions with which to contend, the supreme court has
endorsed the simplest test of all for ascertaining the extent to which
recovery will lie under Section 402A for damage to the product
itself. The courts and, more importantly, merchants should now
be able to rely on commercial law as embodied in the Uniform
Commercial Code to govern the obligations of the parties con-
cerning goods sold. If the Texas Supreme Court solidifies its hold-
ing in Mid Continent as standing for the proposition that recovery
for damage to a product caused by a defect in the product must
be had outside of Section 402A, then Mid Continent may prove
to be a milestone in the development of product liability law. If,
however, the court decimates the Mid Continent rule with excep-
tions and narrowing construction, then this area of product law
will lose not only a valuable precedent, but also a crucial concept.
"Id.
If the watch took a licking, but it kept on ticking, then there would lie no
402A liability for the aircraft damage.
"' In Mid Continent the dissent recited a hypothetical concerning a defective
jet aircraft which crashes into an assortment of other aircraft and personnel. The
dissent predicted that the owner of the jet would be without a tort remedy. 21
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 487.
"See Keeton, Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1978).
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It is to be hoped that the Texas court, as well as other state courts-,
are aware of this and will use time in the interest of simplicity and
predictability, by affirming the rule which is at once fair and un-
derstandable.
H. Michael Warren
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